The New Regime In 
Mexico 



By 

CHARLES W: HACKETT 



Reprinted from The Southwestern Political Science 
Quarterly, Volume II, Number 1, June, 1921 



Austin, Texas 



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F / z. 3 '/ 



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oQ cy.S^h^ 




THE NEW REGIME IN MEXICO^ 

CHARLES W. HACKETT 

University of Texas 

Were it a fact that the present government in Mexico 
had come into power merely as a result of a movement to 
unseat the unpopular Carranza— in short, had personalities 
rather than principles been the general rather than ttie spe- 
cific and immediate cause for the establishment of the pres- 
ent regime in Mexico— simple indeed would be a discussion 
of the steps by which Alvaro Obregon secured the presi- 
dency and of the problems which now confront him in his 
exalted position. Such, however, is not the case. The so-called 
revolution of last, May which drove Carranza from the cap- 
ital and installed the provisional presidency of de la Huerta 
must not be considered as an isolated or as an independent 
movement; rather it was a readjustment within the revolu- 
tion which began in 1910, and which, apparently, has run 
its course, and, we trust, guaranteed its ideals, only with the 
establishment of the present regime in Mexico. 

In other words, when in Mexico today one speaks of the 
"revolution" he does not mean merely the revolution initiated 
and directed by Madero against Diaz. Neither does he 
mean that of Huerta against Madero, nor that of Carranza 
against Huerta, nor even, in these later days, that of Obre- 
gon and de la Huerta against Carranza; instead, by "revolu- 
tion" is meant the entire revolutionary movement covering 
the years from 1910 to 1920. In this sense, then, the pres- 
ent regime in Mexico must be considered as the child, not of 
any particular phase of the ten years of revolution, but of 
the entire revolutionary period from 1910 to 1920. This 
being true, one may expect to find, as is indeed the case, 

iThis paper was read at the meeting of the Southwestern Political 
Science Association, at Austin, Texas, on March 25, 1921. 



2 The New Regime in Mexico 

that the revolutionary principles fought for in 1910 were 
in general the same as those which Obregon and de la Huerta 
apparently realized for the Mexican people last May. True 
the revolutionary principles of 1910 did not remain hard 
and fast the same throughout a ten year period. In some 
instances they changed in character from destructive to con- 
structive ; at the same time there is to be noted a process of 
elimination as well as of evolution. But in general it may 
be said that the revolutionary principles of 1910 were as 
truly at stake when Carranza resorted to force against Obre- 
gon last May as they were when Diaz vainly tried to crush 
the movement led by the incompetent Madero in 1910. Since 
this is the case the establishment of the present regime in 
Mexico must be viewed in the light of past rather than from 
the standpoint solely of more recent developments. 

At the outset it may be said that the Mexican revolution 
which began in 1910 was as inevitable as was the French 
revolution. And as the causes for that more celebrated 
European struggle lay in the history of France as a divine- 
right monarchy, so the causes for the Mexican revolution of 
1910 are to be found in the history of the so-called thirty-iive 
year "presidential reign" pf Porfirio Diaz. That the Mex- 
ican revolution was prolonged for ten years, instead of real- 
izing its purposes earlier, was due to causes as easily ex- 
plained as those which prolonged the struggle for liberty, 
equality, and fraternity in France. It is the purpose of this 
paper, first, to show the continuity of the revolution of 1910 
and to explain the causes which prolonged that movement 
until the present government was elevated to power in Mex- 
ico, and, second, to indicate some of the problems facing the 
new government at the present time. 

Prior to Diaz's advent to power in 1876, Mexico, since in- 
dependence, had become politically as well as financially al- 
most bankrupt. On the political side tiiere had been, in a 
period of fifty-five years, no less than seventy odd different 
governments; of these nearly all had been de facto, fully 
two-thirds had been military, and only a small minority had 
had legal origin. Economic and social conditions were no 






The New Regime in Mexico 3 

better. Sadder yet was the fact that no effective national 
consciousness and no feeling of personal responsibility for 
the state had developed ; instead, the blatant militarism of 
the past half century had produced a whole crop of the 
pronunciamiento type of general. Against these conditions 
and these facts Diaz resolutely set his hand in 1876. 

As a result the "presidential reign" of Porfirio Diaz, cov- 
ering, with the exception of four years, the period from 
1876 until 1911, stands in marked contrast to the political 
instability and financial bankruptcy which characterized 
Mexico's first half century as an independent nation. Since 
the causes for the revolution, which, we trust, definitely came 
to an end just a few months ago, are to be found in this thir- 
ty-five year period, some general considerations concerning 
the chief actor and the period as a whole are pertinent. 
Largely of Indian blood himself — therefore conscious of the 
political and social incapacities of the Mexican people — and 
schooled as he was by years of experience in the political up- 
heavals of the past few decades, Porfirio Diaz sensed with 
remarkable foresight the great need of his country, namely, 
political stability which he proposed to secure through a 
strong executive. By the blood and iron policy of a Bis- 
marck, or the Machiavellian policy of an Italian prince, or 
acting on the theory that every man has his price — by either 
or all of these methods, it mattered not which — Diaz soon 
succeeded in bringing order out of chaos, and in establish- 
ing political stability and financial responsibility where 
kaleidoscopic changes of government and bankruptcy had 
been the rule theretofore. But in spite of this, once safely 
in power, Diaz feigned a desire to proceed strictly along 
the paths of constitutionality; the constitution, instead of 
being a thing to be set aside or ignored at will, was con- 
veniently and legally amended whenever his program so de- 
manded. As a result, Mexico began to recuperate, and, for 
the first time in their history, Mexicans came to realize that 
peace and prosperity go hand in hand. Industry, commerce, 
and agriculture were promoted and developed, and by 1910 
Mexico's favorable trade balance had trebled under Diaz. 



4 The New Regime in Mexico 

The financial program of Limantour, aside from atu acting 
foreign capital, yielded beneficent reforms, not the least of 
which was the adoption of gold as the monetary standard in 
1895. Under Diaz the number of miles of railroad were in- 
creased from 407 in 1876 to 15,000 in 1910, one-half of which 
were government owned. One billion dollars worth of gold 
was mined between 1876 and 1910; the coal output in 1910 
was one-half million tons; and, before the overthrow of 
Diaz, oil was discovered at Tampico and the development of 
the petroleum fields had been begun. On the social side the 
population had increased frorn ten to fifteen millions, of 
which in 1910 a larger proportion were foreigners than in 
1876. The number of schools had trebled and the number 
of pupils had been multiplied by six. 'Teace, order, law; 
an increasing population ; internal wealth and well-being ; a 
flourishing industry and commerce; suitable care for things 
mental as well as material; respect and confidence of for- 
eigners — these were the blessings," according to Shepherd, 
"which Mexico had never enjoyed. And Mexicans, once in 
anarchy and enmity created by Clericals and Militarists, 
came to know each other in friendship."^ 

Such was the hopeful side of the picture that could be 
drawn of Mexico in 1910. But this was not the full picture. 
Prosperity v/as only one-sided and there was a growing so- 
cial, economic, and political unrest. The masses were still 
held in economic and social degradation ; in fact, in country 
districts and on the large estates, especially after the pass- 
age of the confiscatory land law of 1894, the condition of the 
lower classes had probably been made worse. Due to the 
investment of so much foreign capital and the remarkable 
internal development and progress of the country as a 
whole, there had been an educational and an industrial awak- 
ening of the better-to-do laboring classes, whose chief cause 
of dissatisfaction was the rigid supression of the labor 
union. The suppression of rural credits at home and the 
growing concessions to foreign investors worked as a two- 



iSbepherd, W. R. Hispanic Natio7is of the Netv World (New- 
Haven), p. 154. 



The New Regime in Mexico 5 

edged sword. "Mexico the mother of foreigners and the 
stepmother of Mexicans" was the resentful cry of protest 
that went up in answer to the discrimination made in this 
respect by the Diaz government. In the states and in the 
outlying districts the monopoly of justice — ^more often of in- 
justice — which was held by the governors, the jefes politicos, 
and the chieftains of bands of rurales, who, secure in their 
positions, exercised authority without responsibility, was 
resented by the politically ambitious and the intelligent few 
which the years of peace, prosperity, and political stability 
under Diaz had produced. Equal resentment was felt by 
the same minority for the small group of Cientificos at the 
capital who had the ear and controlled the policy of Diaz. 
In substance, then, what the revolutionaries of 1910 de- 
manded "was the retirement of the President, Vice Presi- 
dent, and Cabinet; a return to the' principle of no reelection 
to the chief magistracy ; a guarantee of fair elections at all 
times; the choice of capable, honest, and impartial judges, 
jefes politicos, and other officials ; and, in particular, a series 
of agrarian and industrial reforms which would break up 
the great estates, create peasant proprietorships, and better 
conditions of the working classes."^ 

Without going into detail it may be said, then, that bene- 
ficient and constructive as had been the reign of Diaz, it 
had created a condition for the Mexican people, in whole or 
in part, which was in advance of the political system under 
which they were living. This in brifef is the keynote of the 
entire revolutionary movement between the years 1910. and 
1920 ; whatever the avowed purpose or program of any par- 
ticular leader, whatever the differences between his program 
and that of his successor or his predecessor during that ten 
year period, it was the general program of the great major- 
ity to strike a more happy medium between general condi- 
tions and the Diaz political system than had theretofore ex- 
isted. If this be true, as the evidence indicates, the revolu- 
tion was inevitable; that the revolution was inevitable is 
shown by the spontaneity of the movement, for it is a fact 



iShepherd, W. R., op. cit., p. 201. 



6 The New Regime in Mexico 

that few movements in history have shown greater spon- 
taneity. 

Such being the case Madero did not play an essential part 
in the revolution of 1910. Without his condemnation of 
the "presidential succession" of that year there would in 
time have come a revolution, either during the lifetime 
of Diaz or at his death. It was the system, the incon- 
gruity between the political and the general conditions, 
which made the revolution inevitable, and not the fact that 
Diaz was succeeding himself, or that he had provided for 
the succession of a chosen vice-president in case of his death 
or disability, as Madero unwittingly thought. Madero, 
then, in a sense, was an opportunist ; he went into power on 
the wave of an unprecedented popular movement without 
having done much to promote it ; he simply applied the match 
to the smouldering discontent which prevailed in Mexico. 
But therein does not lie the disappointing fact in connection 
with Madero. Not sensing the full extent and the character 
of the popular unrest, and believing that it was absolutely 
necessary "to spread molasses to catch flies" in order to 
achieve his program, he indulged in all kinds of idealistic 
plans and visionary promises, such as free and universal 
suffrage, and, if not "forty acres and a mule," at least a 
division of the land among the masses. All this had the 
effect of propagating ideas which should never have been 
advanced, and, at the same time, served to becloud the real 
issue of the movement, namely, the readjustment of things 
in general so that the political system of Mexico should come 
to be more nearly in keeping with the general conditions 
under which Mexicans lived. 

When Madero was unable and even failed to try to fulfill 
the many visionary promises made during the course of the 
revolution to unseat Diaz ; when he practiced nepotism and 
even reimbursed the family exchequer for the losses incurred 
during the revolution instead of granting to the ambitious 
and intelligent minority the political privileges which they 
craved, and to the lower classes the boon which they ex- 
pected ; when he attempted to compromise with the conserva- 



The New Regime in Mexico 7 

tive element and squandered the money in the national trea- 
sury which had been saved up by the Diaz administration ; 
when he struck at the old system without offering anything 
better, it was inevitable that there should be a reaction 
against him. Surprising it would have been had there not 
come in time a reaction against his idealistic and imprac- 
ticable program alone. But this does not mean that there 
was ever the slightest danger that there should be a reaction 
against the real purpose of the revolution which was so 
remarkably spontaneous and unanimous. 

If the revolution of 1910 was spontaneous and practically 
unanimous, the reaction against Madero was scarcely less 
so. The state of Oaxaca seceded in November 1911. Pas- 
cual Orozco, former Maderista commander in Chihuahua, 
turned against his chief in February, 1912. Anti-Maderis- 
tas occupied the states of Sinaloa and Durango. Felix Diaz 
headed an abortive revolt in the state of Vera Cruz. And 
it is a fact, though generally not known, that Carranza in 
Coahuila threw down the gauntlet to the discredited Madero 
a few weeks before the latter was overthrown. The down- 
fall of Madero then was as inevitable as had been the revolu- 
tion which carried him into power. But the significant fact 
in this connection is that while there was unanimity of pur- 
pose among those who were opposing Madero, there was no 
unanimity of political ideals among them. And an unkind 
fate decreed that of all those opposing Madero for this or 
for that reason, one who was most at variance with the gen- 
eral purposes of the revolution of 1910 — a dyed-in-the-wool 
conservative and reactionary — should, by a coup d'etat, cap- 
ture not only the unhappy and misguided Madero but the 
reins of government as well. This was Victoriano Huerta. 
Educated in youth by and later trained in the political school 
of Diaz ; a former Cientifico himself ; thoroughly wedded to 
the "blood and iron" policy; by nature shrewd, cunning, 
heartless, yet capable, his act in cabling to Diaz in Paris that 
"at last the revolution against you has been* avenged" is no 
cause for surprise. It indicated that the pendulum of polit- 
ical revolution in Mexico was not merely to swing from the 



8. The New Regime in Mexico 

extreme and impracticable radicalism or liberalism of Ma- 
dero to conservatism and reaction. Instead, it was but nat- 
ural to expect the worst, namely, that the outright methods 
and policy of a Diaz were to be followed ; that the old regime 
was to be restored. 

Under such conditions, therefore, it was inevitable that 
there should be opposition to Huerta by those who really de- 
sired the social, industrial, and political reforms for which 
the revolution of 1910 had stood. Doubtless had he received 
the moral or material support of the United States he might 
have maintained his position for an indefinite period. Evo- 
lution without revolution might have followed, and Mexico 
might have been spared many years of travail. But the 
force of the revolutionary movement of 1910 was such that 
a return to the system of Diaz was an absolute impossibility. 

Had Huerta remained in power readjustments would ne- 
cessarily have come and a more happy medium between the 
ultra-conservatives and the ultra-radicals would have been 
struck, or else he could have held on only by sheer and over- 
whelming force of arms. With Huerta as the "man of 
iron," then, compromiise was out of the question for the self- 
styled Constitucionalistas, who soon raised on their shields 
Venustiano Carranza. Among those who gave him their 
support were Pancho Villa, Pablo Gonzalez, Lucio Blanco, 
and Alvaro Obregon ; in fact it was in defense of the prin- 
ciples which were downed with Madero that Alvaro Obregon 
now came forth. 

The fact that Huerta had secured his position by force of 
arms and that his rise to power had been followed almost 
immediately by the questionable death of Madero, were, to 
these revolutionaries, not the vital points at issue. To arms 
against the Cientifico heir of a Diaz and in behalf of the re- 
volutionary standard that had already fallen from the hands 
of an incompetent Madero, was their program. However, 
the government of the United States, through President Wil- 
son, and eleven other foreign governments, including Argen- 
tina, Brazil, and Chile, took a different view'of the situation, 
and this, too, despite the recognition of the Huerta govern- 



The New Regime in Mexico 9 

ment by no less than twenty-eight other foreign govern- 
ments. To the twelve obstinate governments it mattered 
not in theory whether Huerta leaned towardliberal or con- 
servative policies ; the one essential was that governments 
established by force should not be recognized. Ably did 
President Wilson set forth this policy in his annual address 
to Congress on December 2, 1913 : 

There can be no certain prospect of peace in 
America until General Huerta has surrendered his 
usurped authority in Mexico ; until it is understood 
on all hands, indeed, that such pretended govern- 
ments will not be countenanced or dealt with by the 
government of the United States. . . . Mexico 
has no government. The attempt to maintain one 
at the City of Mexico has broken down and a mere 
military despotism been set up which has hardly 
more than the semblance of national authority. It 
originated in the usurpation of Victoriano Huerta, 
who, after a brief attempt to play the part of con- 
stitutional president, has at last cast aside the pre- 
tense of legal right and declared himself dictator. 

Thus it was that contending for one principle the United 
States and associated governments played into the hands of 
the Constitucionalistas of Mexico who were contending for 
entirely different principles. Both were aiming at the un- 
seating of Huerta, and in this each was an aid to the other. 
But between the associated governments and the Carrancis- 
tas there was no harmony of principles. The insult to the 
American flag at Tampico and the American occupation of 
Vera Cruz were contributing factors in the final overthrow 
of Huerta, but they served to widen the breach between 
the United States and the forces opposing Huerta in Mexico ; 
at the same time they failed to increase the moral or political 
prestige of the United States anywhere. After the sever- 
ance of diplomatic relations in April, 1915, and the A. B. C. 
mediation, the conference at Niagara Falls, Ontario, while 
failing to choose a provisional president for Mexico, proved 
to be the handwriting on the wall. Huerta was doomed. 
The capture of Zacatecas by Pablo Gonzalez and of Guadala- 



10 The New Regime in Mexico 

jara by Alvaro Obregon in July, 1915, were the final blows 
to the government of the second "man of iron" in Mexico. 
One week after the capture of Guadalajara, Huerta followed 
Diaz to Europe. 

With the assumption of control by Carranza as the "de- 
pository of executive power" on August 20, 1914, the party 
which theoretically had stood for the revolutionary principles 
of 1920 had crushed the reactionary opposition led by Huerta. 
But the question now was would the pendelum swing back 
to the ultra-radical program of Madero, or would the revo- 
lution follow a saner middle course. Before the question 
could be settled civil war developed. Villa and Carranza 
quarrelled over the question of the former's candidacy for 
the presidency. Mexico City, rather than principles, seemed 
to be the prize for which the contending factions fought, 
and, in less than seven months, it changed hands no less 
than six times. Little wonder then that Mexico in this 
period came to be dubbed the "land where peace breaks out 
once in a while." 

Out of this unfortunate civil strife it looked as though 
Villa would come ias the strong man of Mexico. Certainly 
this was the current if not the official view of the United 
States. In January, 1915, General Scott, U. S. A., held a 
conference with Villa and later emissaries were sent by 
President Wilson to parley with him. But Villa's sun began 
to set when Obregon paid for a victory over him with the 
loss of his right arm at Celaya in 1915. The anomalous sit- 
uation of no de facto government existing in Mexico was not 
to come to an end, however, until the United States and six 
Hispanic American countries were again impelled to offer 
friendly mediation. Like the proverbial bone tossed to the 
hungry dogs these associated powers now offered a prize to 
the contending factions ; to the one which after three weeks 
was most successful in securing order was to be accorded 
recognition by these powers. Carranza qualified, and on 
October 19, 1915, the United States and eight other Ameri- 



The New Regime in Mexico H 

can governments formally recognized him as the head of the 
de facto government in Mexico. 

Still peace and a constructive revolutionary program were 
to be denied Mexico. Piqued at the success of his rival, 
Villa now started upon a career that was to make for him a 
place in history as the j oiliest cut-throat of his age. The 
Santa Isabel massacre, the Columbus raid, and the Pershing 
punitive expedition were but the outstanding incidents in 
connection with the deliberate attempt of Villa to provoke 
armed intervention in Mexico by the United States, and 
thereby, to embarrass the Carranza government. But the 
demand of Carranza that the United States troops not march 
"in a direction other than the north," and the final with- 
drawal of American troops in February, 1917, constituted 
triumphs for the first chief; of these incidents it may be 
said that they also signally failed to increase the moral or 
political prestige of the United States. 

The situation which prevailed in Mexico from the over- 
throw of Huerta in 1914 until the withdrawal of the Persh- 
ing expedition in 1917 was such that the purposes of the 
revolution of 1910 could not be realized or even developed; 
rather, on the face of things they had apparently succumbed. 
But the very day that the last American soldier crossed the 
Eio Grande from Mexico, a constituent assembly at Quereta- 
ro adopted a new constitution. Truly, then, could the forces 
of reform and readjustment look forward hopefully for some 
achievements. The great question was could these achieve- 
ments be realized under Carranza, or would complications 
arise that would delay the reform movement? 

The constitution of 1917 was an attempt to answer this 
question. By it the Constitution of 1857, which, theoret- 
ically at least, had been the fundamental law of the land, 
was set aside and one which embodied the revolutionary 
program of 1910 was adopted. This is not the place to 
discuss the Constitution of 1917. Suffice it to say that how- 
ever much it differed from the idealistic and Utopian pro- 
gram of Madero, it expressed socialistic and anti-foreign 
sentiment and breathed a suspiciously unsympathetic senti- 



12 The New Regime in Mexico 

ment toward the centuries old idea of inviolability of private 
property. But the man, not the new constitution, was the 
all important factor. Constitutions, like treaties, can, under 
certain conditions, become as scraps of paper, and, in this 
regard, Mexico has not been the least sinner. But in this 
particular case it was the man and not the constitution 
which defaulted. Without going to one extreme, as Madero, 
or to the other as Huerta, Carranza, by the sins of omis- 
sion as well as by those of commission, failed to achieve for 
Mexico the program which it expected and demanded. 

The constitution was never really in force and ac- 
ceptance within the controlled area. Its Utopian 
provision for bettering labor conditions were never 
enacted into law or generally observed under de- 
crees. Its emancipation of the peon class was nul- 
lified by the condition of semi-warfare which per- 
vaded most areas outside the large cities. The fi- 
nancial condition of the country left much to be de- 
sired. . . The educational system had been left in 
the Federal District, and only in a few places— 
notably not in the capital — did it receive adequate 
financing and attention. Promised improvements 
in the operation of the courts still left the people 
"hungering and thirsting for justice"; the jails 
have been continuously crowded with untried. The 
legislative branch broke with the president in so 
far as it could. . . The City of Mexico, given 
rein as a "free municipality," one of the shibboleths 
of the revolution, was remiss in police regulations, 
sanitation, education, administration of justice, 
and in control of public morals. The president had 
violated the ballot, imposing his own candidates as 
governors in numerous states, and had used these 
gentlemen to further his design to seat his own can- 
didate as his successor, had arrested the partisans 
of Obregon, and imprisoned, upon flimsy charges, 
the members of Congress who opposed him.^ 

Coupled with Carranza's mistakes at home was an un- 
fortunate foreign policy, which was largely the result of 



iPriestley, H. I., "The Carranza Debacle,'" in, University of Cali- 
fornia. Chronicle, July, 1920, p. 405. 



The New Regime in Mexico 13 

the World War. His anti-American feeling was shown by 
his open, if not his formal, sympathy with Germany, and 
by his efforts to organize a Pan-Hispanic American organ- 
ization in opposition to the United States. In view of the 
outcome of the World War, if for no other reason, many 
Mexicans feel that Carranza let pass a golden opportunity 
for strengthening his own position at home and for increas- 
ing Mexico's moral and political prestige among the na- 
tions, when he failed to sympathize with, if not join, the 
allied forces against Germany. 

Yet there were many worthy traits about Carranza and 
many good things which were done by him while president. 
Perhaps the following estimate of him is only slightly over- 
drawn : 

Carranza's contribution toward Mexico's regen- 
eration cannot be ignored and time only will give it 
proper value. He loved his people. . . He was 
the strong man needed to coordinate the forces of 
the revolution after Madero. His dominant will, 
his stubborn courage and patience were required in 
those days. . . He led his people from one mile- 
stone of progress to another and lost his life be- 
cause of the qualities which to them were useful 
during the days he led to victory.^ 

In spite of Carranza's failure to secure for Mexico the 
fundamental principles of the revolution ; in spite of his un- 
fortunate foreign policies ; in spite of the fact that many of 
his former supporters came to regard him as a traitor to the 
revolutionary principles, in support of which he had taken 
up arms, and to feel that only personalities rather than prin- 
ciples had triumphed, Carranza would have been permitted 
to conclude his term of office but for one thing, and that was 
his determination to perpetuate his unpopular poHcies by 
using the machinery of his administration to elect a suc- 
cessor who would not only be satisfactory but subservient to 
him. Inevitably this called for action if principles were to 



iNoel, J. v., "Mexico and the Present Revolution," in Journal of 
International Developments, January, 1921, p. 372. 



14 The New Regime in Mexico 

triumph over personalities. On April 23, 1920, Obregon,. 
de la Huerta, and others subscribed to the Plan de Agua 
Prieta, which reaffirmed the Constitution of 1917, called for 
an "organic plan for democracy, law, and order," and de- 
manded the resignation of Carranza and the establishment 
of a provisional government, pending an election. Omit* 
ting details, Obregon entered Mexico City at the head of hi& 
loyal Yaquis on May 8 upon the heels of the fleeing Carranza.. 
Misfortune attended almost every step of the former "first 
chief," and on the night of May 20 he fell by an assassin's 
bullet. The provisional presidency of de la Huerta was in- 
stalled on May 25. Its chief mission, aside from tempo- 
rarily assuming the reins of government, was to guarantee 
an election that would reflect the desires of the people of 
Mexico after nearly ten years of revolution. That the reins 
of government were well handled is instanced by the dra- 
matic and strategic way in which the abortive rebellion in 
Nuevo Leon, headed by the once popular Pablo Gonzales, 
was crushed in ten days, and that an unexpended balance 
of over seven million dollars was accumulated in the na- 
tional treasury. The election, itself, held in September, 
elevated to power, on December first, the present govern- 
ment in Mexico. 

The establishment of the present government in Mexico, 
then, is not to be considered as the triumph of personalities 
over personalities ; rather it was but one phase, and we trust 
the final one, in an effort to achieve or guarantee a reform 
program for an unfortunate and downtrodden people. If 
this is true, surely a new regime has been ushered in for 
Mexico. 

But what is the present status of the reform movement in 
Mexico? Have the political, social, industrial, and economic 
reforms for which Mexico was revolutionized in 1910 been 
achieved since the overthrow of Carranza, and if not, will 
they be achieved? Certainly as yet a full reform program 
has not been realized ; it is too much to expect this in a few 
weeks or even months. As to whether this program will be 
realized, it does not lie within the province of the historical 



.^ 



The New Regime in Mexico 15 

investigator to prophesy. But this much is certain. Pub- 
lic opinion is behind the present government to a degree 
almost unprecedented in the entire history of Mexico, and 
if essential reforms have not been realized, opinion prevails 
that in time they will be. As a result, Mexico, which a few 
months ago was torn by civil strife, is enjoying almost un- 
precedented peace. The man Obregon is largely responsible 
for this. With a full military record behind him — ^the hope, 
according to his gallant chief -of -staff , of the revolutionaries 
as early as the dark days of 1915 — ^he is exceedingly popular 
with all classes, particularly the soldiery. A trained and 
successful business man himself, he is at the same time the 
hope, if not the popular hero, of the masses. 

It is also true that for the first time since 1910 it is pos- 
sble to expect a sane, middle-course — fairly conservative, 
yet sufficiently liberal — readjustment of conditions in Mex- 
ico. It has been essayed to show that such could not be ex- 
pected from Madero, and that for contrary reasons the 
Huerta regime was equally disappointing. Perhaps the 
historic mission of Carranza was to coordinate the forces 
of rebellion and save Mexico from Villa until his usefulness 
in this respect was over. Hence, after three failures, the 
responsibilities facing the new government are all the more 
tremendous. Time alone will tell whether Obregon will 
succeed, as he and his associates are earnestly trying to do, 
in bringing Mexico out upon a high road to a new and a 
more responsible national existence. As regards this it is 
too early to speak with assurance, and acts, rather than 
words are the essentials. But indications are that Obregon 
senses the responsibilities of the new government in this 
respect, as is evident from the opening remarks in his ad- 
dress to the special session of the Mexican Congress on Feb- 
ruary 7, 1921 : 

It would be a shame for a government, conscious 
of its duties and of its powers, not to take advantage 
of this opportunity, the only one in the history of 
Mexico from 1910 to the present, to respond to the 
demands of public opinion and to the desideratum 
of all the best elements, realizing, in accordance 



16 The New Regime in Mexico 

with its constitutional powers, the reforms which 
it is urgent to put into practice, and endeavoring, 
in so far as it is possible, to elevate, to a marked 
degree, the cultural level of the people.^ 

But many grave problems, both internal and foreign, must 
be settled before the purposes and the ideals of the revolu- 
tion can be said to have been realized. Briefly it is purposed 
to indicate with the minimum of discussion what are some 
of these problems. 

First, and probably most important, is the necessity of 
restoring the national credit and of putting the finances of 
the country on a stable basis. This will not be difficult, once 
a stable government is established which can inspire confi- 
dence and respect both at home and abroad. This will be 
evident when it is realized that the total debt of Mexico, in- 
cluding accumulated interest thereon, is only about $1,100,- 
000,000, or about $68 per capita. By way of comparison 
the war debt alone of the United States is about four times 
as great per capita. With Mexico today, as it was in the 
time of Humboldt, the greatest undeveloped country in the 
world, her monetary obligations, given certain conditions at 
home, are certainly not the occasion for alarm or depression. 
As for the stabilization of Mexico's finances, not the least 
step will be the establishment of an effective modern bank- 
ing system. Referring to this matter in his address to con- 
gress last month President Obregon said: 

The great difficulties which the Republic has ex- 
perienced, due to the lack of a solidly established 
banking system which may diffuse throughout the 
entire country the benefits of commercial credit, are 
so obviously patent and have provoked so great a 
crisis that it is unnecessary to attempt to point 
them out and even more useless to explain the su- 
preme necessity which exists of effecting a radical 
remedy for the chaotic situation which, in this re- 



iThis and the succeeding excerpts from President Obregon's mes- 
sage of February 7, 1921, were translated by the author from the full 
text of the message which was printed in The Mexican Review 
(Washington, March, 1921), Vol. IV, No. 8, pp. 3-7. 



The New Regime in Mexico 17 

spect, prevails in the Republic. Accordingly, the 
first matter to which the call refers, is the expedi- 
tion of a law which may settle the problem of banks 
of issue. The Executive has the greatest confi- 
dence that the plan which he presents for the ser- 
ious consideration of the Congress will be consid- 
ered in an impartial and dispassionate manner, 
and in the light of the principles which control the 
economic life of the people. 

In the second place something must be done to make ef- 
fective Article 123 of the Constitution of 1917, which article 
relates to the uplift of the industrial classes. Continuing 
in his above-mentioned message. President Obregon says: 

Labor laws are measures of protection for the 
laboring class, the opportuneness and necessity of 
which no one can deny, for the tendency of modern 
thought and culture in this respect is so marked 
that any government which should desire to oppose 
a humanitarian movement of such importance, not 
only would be unsuccessful, but would fail to per- 
form its duty. For this reason the Executive has 
hoped to realize one of the most beautiful ideals of 
the revolution and to give to Article 123 of the 
constitution immediate practical effect. 

Not less important, in the third place, is the adoption of a 
sane agrarian policy which will restore the land to the peo- 
ple, not divide it among them. No such socialistic scheme 
as the actual division of the land is either contemplated or 
practicable. The ordinary peon class, which constitutes 
the great majority in Mexico, is probably even more un- 
fitted to take hold of the agricultural life and development of 
Mexico than were the most African of the slaves in the 
South in 1865. Farmers must be made of them, but at the 
same time they must be given assurances that in the making 
they will not be deprived of their birth-right. President 
Obregon's admonition to the congress on this matter is al- 
together sane and hopeful: 

The agrarian law has for its object the solution, 
in so far as it is possible, of the already old but 
ever important problem of the land. In the revo- 



18 The Neiv Regime in Mexico 

lutionary program the equitable distribution of the 
land among the proletarian class figures in the 
opening phrases, and the executive ought to see to 
it that the promise does not remain in the sphere of 
political dreams, and yet, on the other hand not to 
pretend to transform the entire agrarian system 
which it controls, nor to strike at the bases of the 
very fundamentals of the agricultural life of the 
country. If, in truth, the substance of the agrarian 
law which I submit to the consideration of the leg- 
islative power, is inspired by the most advanced 
revolutionary problems, it is also founded on the 
concrete knowledge of the necessities of the coun- 
try and of the practical difficulties which a law 
of this kind must encounter in its realization. 

Probably the biggest problem and the one which when 
solved will have the most salutary effect upon the country 
is that of education. Accordingly President Obregon in- 
cludes in his message the following; 

Federalization of education, the creation of the 
secretariats of public instruction and of labor . . . 
are matters which respond in so frank a manner 
to the necessities of a good adniiiiistration and to 
the vital problem of broadening the culture of the 
people by all the means at the disposal of the state, 
that it is sufficient to announce the purpose of the 
respective laws for the National Congress to com- 
prehend at once the importance of the matters re^ 
ferred to and the necessity of prompt action 
thereon. 

In a land where in the rural districts probably ninety per 
cent of the people are illiterate, and in the urban districts 
fully forty per cent cannot read and write, the timeliness 
of President Obregon's injunction to the congress is all the 
more evident. And in this respect generous it is that so 
many American universities are responding to the appeal of 
the American Chamber of Commerce in the City of Mexico, 
and are offering to Mexican students scholarships that vnll 
guarantee to them an American education. The far reach- 
ing effect of the movement cannot be over-estimated, whether 



The New Regime in Mexico 19 

looked at from the standpoint of advancement of education 
in Mexico, or from that of the development of trade and 
commerce, or of international amity. Four such students 
who entered the University of Texas last January, have, in 
the examination period just ended, justified by their records 
the confidence which the University regents and the Amer- 
ican Chamber of Commerce in Mexico City reposed in them. 
In the fifth place the oil question, which in turn revolves 
around the famous Article 27 of the Constitution, is a ser- 
ious one. In this connection the Obregon government is 
between two fires. To abrogate Article 27, even if it were 
so desired, would spell disaster at home; to rigidly enforce 
it, either by a strict interpretation of its provisions, or by 
presidential decrees, would most certainly destroy all pros- 
pects of recognition by the United States and other foreign 
governments. That President Obregon senses the delicate 
situation is clear from the following excerpt from his mes- 
sage to congress : 

Around the petroleum question are agitated grave 
problems of an internal and an international char- 
acter which necessarily will have no little bearing 
on the future progress of the country. On the one 
hand is the principle of national autonomy, which 
the revolution proclaimed as indispensable for co- 
ordinating with economic progress all the active 
forces and all the elements of wealth in the Repub- 
lic. On the other hand are the interests of the 
owners of petroleum properties which are opposing, 
either before the tribunals of Mexico, or in diplo- 
matic ways, the application of Article 27 of the 
constitution. This has resulted in making the pe- 
troleum problem an important one abroad, and is 
presenting serious difficulties which can only be 
solved by dispassionately studying the manner of 
preserving the interests of the nation without, at 
the same time, injuring unjustly the interests of 
native and foreign owners, which property has 
been acquired legally and justly. 

In the sixth place not the least problem is the readjust- 
ment of Mexico on a peace basis. Particularly does this ap- 



20 The New Regime in Mexico 

ply to the military. The blatant militarism of the ten years 
of revolution produced on the political side no fewer than 
sixteen presidents, one of whom broke all former records 
when he held executive power only fifty-six minutes. On 
the military side another crop of the pronunciamiento type 
of general was produced who had not the principles of the 
revolution at heart but purely his own interests. On good 
authority the statement has been made that during the last 
days of the Carranza domination there were more generals 
on the pay rolls of the Mexican Army than there were allied 
generals at any one time during the entire World War. 
And the total budget for the army, was, conservatively^ 
speaking, three-fourths of the total expense of the govern- 
ment for all purposes. To deal with this situation requires 
tact. This situation President Obregon is meeting with 
tact and also with firmness, and steps have been taken to 
reduce the generals in the army as well as to force proper 
subjection to the national government, all with a very salu- 
tary effect. 

Finally, is to be noted the importance of the foreign at- 
titude, particularly that of the United States. It is alto- 
gether possible that the Obregon government could survive 
an indefinite period without recognition from the United 
States; it is an indisputable fact that recognition by the 
United States would constitute the greatest moral triumph 
and asset to the new government. And in this regard Mex- 
ico is cultivating the friendship of the United States, and 
the people, and even officially some of the state governments, 
of the United States are cultivating the friendship of Mex- 
ico. The recent visit of Obregon as president-elect to the 
Dallas Fair ; the generous and unprecedented entertainment, 
as guests of the nation of large delegations, both official and 
commercial, from fourteen states north of the Rio Grande 
at the inauguration of the new president in Mexico City; 
and the visiting delegation from Mexico at the inauguration 
of Governor Neff of Texas in January, are but instances to 
show that a new era of understanding and international 
amity has been ushered in on the border. Perhaps this new 



The New Regime in Mexico 21 

sentiment was best expressed by President Obregon on 
December 4, 1920, when he and his cabinet were honor 
guests at a luncheon given at Chapultepec Cafe, in Mexico 
City, by the official Texas delegation, of which the author 
was a member. In response to a toast offered by Governor 
Hobby, of Texas, President Obregon, in a manner extra- 
ordinarily sincere addressed the following personal message 
to his hosts : 

The Governor of Texas, ladies and gentlemen : 
For a long time on our frontiers truth was consid- 
ered as contraband, and by the propagation of 
calumny and untruth all kinds of unfortunate mis- 
understandings and hatreds grew stronger each 
day. But fortunately for both peoples the time has 
indeed arrived when truth has found its way along 
our frontiers. A new era of cordiality and love 
has been initiated between the two peoples who, for 
so long a time, misunderstood each other. And we 
are absolutely confident now that men of moral and 
intellectual vigor like the Governor of Texas have 
taken it upon themselves to propagate the truth in 
their country, that we will become better known by 
our brothers of the north. 

I choose to believe that these excursions but mark 
the beginning of a new life of greater social inter- 
change between the two countries, and that they also 
mark the beginning of a series of excursions in 
which men and women of all ages will cross the 
border from the United States to Mexico, and that 
men and women of all ages will cross the frontier 
from Mexico to the United States as messengers of 
cordiality and fraternity; that in the near future 
we may know each other intimately and be able to 
study, without prejudice, the problems affecting 
the two peoples, confident that we will find that they 
are parallel. And we will come to the conclusion 
that the material interests which are opposing the 
frank understanding which ought to exist between 
the two peoples are very small indeed, and they will 
appear still smaller if they are compared with the 
greater interests of both countries. When we come 
to the conclusion that Americans who defend the 
interests of Mexico are defending their own inter- 
ests, and that Mexicans who defend the interests. 



22 The New Regime in Mexico 

of the United States are defending their own in- 
terests, there is no power that will be able to break 
the bonds between the two countries. 

I hope that you all will serve as messengers for 
these sincere phrases, confident that they interpret 
the sentiments of the Mexican people. 

Governor Hobby, accept our frank and sincere 
gratitude for your actuation, so sincere, in behalf 
of Mexico, and for the opportunity which you have 
given us to send this message to the sons of your 
own country.^ 



^Author's translation of President Obregon's toast as printed in 
El Universal of Mexico City on December 5, 1920. 



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